

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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Security Information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 14 December 1953

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SL-53: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain  
 Possible US Courses of Action in Indochina through  
 1954

1. Many of the disagreements noted in our earlier memorandum have been removed as a result of discussion in the IAC and the furnishing of a new assumption 6 which specifically states that the US will warn Communist China that the US will retaliate if Communist China intervenes after our forces are committed. However, State still reserves its position on para. 4 and believes that, even in early stages of US action, open intervention by the Chinese Communists is possible.

2. The basic disagreement on para. 10 remains. The Board of National Estimates and JIO believe that, after 10 warnings, the chances are better than even that the Chinese Communists would not risk open intervention. We point out in para. 7 and 9 f and g that the Chinese Communists would probably estimate that the US could be tied down indefinitely in Indochina by guerrilla warfare tactics. All the other agencies believe that, in spite of 10 warnings, the chances are better than even that the Chinese Communists would openly intervene to protect their prestige, their security and their position in Southeast Asia. They argue that the Chinese Communists "don't scare easily" and that they would never be convinced that US retaliation would be "extensive and intense."

GENERAL JUST  
 Assistant Director  
 National Estimates

JRS:PAB:le  
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Security Information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 14 December 1959

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GEORGE EAST  
Assistant Director  
National Estimates

JRS:PAB:le

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